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EMPOWERING SUSTAINABLE POVERTY REDUCTION BY 
PASTORALISTS IN POST CONFLICT SOMALILAND
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
This proposal is aimed at informed participatory action with Somali pastoralists in 
Somaliland based on clear thinking to restore livelihoods and rebuild public service provision 
and a legitimate state in the wake of a failed state and violent conflict.
Among the pernicious phenomena that have become distinctive features of the second half of 
the current century are:
■ a dramatic shift away from deadly violence and conflict of an inter-state nature with a 
even more dramatic rise in intra-state deadly conflict, and
■ the emergence of an accelerating incidence of what are called "failed states," a term 
defined only loosely but taken to mean the collapse of all legitimate order.
Although by no means exclusive, both phenomena are most in evidence in Africa where these 
pernicious trends show signs of accelerating.
Given these factors, three questions have moved to centre stage in the United Nations, in 
national policy fora and in much public discourse. The first question is how deadly conflict 
can be prevented and minimized (this was the subject of a major international commission 
convened in 1996 by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace). The second question is the post 
conflict question: how (i.e. with what instruments, policies, modalities) can successful and 
effective political, social and economic reconstruction be brought about following deadly 
conflict. The third question is really the in extremis extension of the second and asks what 
the international community can do in attempts to deal constructively with failed states.
Although this programme proposal focuses essentially on the second question, it is obvious 
that it may also bear importantly on the other two questions. What is clear is that policy 
guidance and informed action are urgently required if the world is even to begin to respond 
constructively to the numerous and increasing intra-state, post conflict situations.
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Surprisingly, this has been an area of very little in the way of systemic examination and
action, most responses to date being characterised by their reactive and short term natures.
What is proposed here is to address those shortcomings with application to Somaliland and in
particular the pastoralist people making up 50% of its population.
This programme proposal, therefore, is based on four basic contentions:
1. Rehabilitation and relegitimisation after conflict and state disintegration is both an urgent 
and an increasingly important challenge to development praxis and analysis;
2. Most international actions to date have largely been predicated on imported Tit the 
ground running’, ’one size fits all’ approaches. These have poor demonstrably track 
records littered with catastrophic failures - not least in Somalia/Somaliland. In addition, 
most academic research on conflict has either been conducted at high levels of abstraction 
or focused on diplomatic and narrowly political spheres. The result is that both 
international efforts and existing scholarship do not provide much direct insight into ways 
and means of, or priorities for rehabilitation, relegitimisation, conflict vulnerability 
reduction and reconciliation support;
3. What this calls for is a combination of fresh thinking and more deliberate and informed 
interventions. It is exactly this combination that is proposed here. The emphasis in this 
proposal is first on getting right the understanding of the complexity of problems 
confronted through an integral linking of from contextual knowledge collection and 
analysis to participatory consultation with domestic civil society and governmental actors. 
This, we are convinced, is the most promising say forward and likely to vastly increase 
the prospects of success. We are also convinced that this approach will prodice a range of 
much-need general lessons which would prove invaluable to other efforts at post conflict 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. This is so not merely in respect to short term benefits to 
poor, conflict impacted people, but even more in respect to social and political 
rehabilitation, domestic ownership and capacity build up and sustainability;
4. the participatory process, the empowerment of civil and governmental actors and an 
ongoing consultative process among major domestic and external actors are important. 
This is not alternative, but integral to, programmatic content. Unless a process and 
organisations do product real outputs which are of priority importance to real people they 
cannot be sustained.
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Somaliland is one of a growing number of territories seeking to claw both back and forward 
to social, political and economic rehabilitation and to a sustainable, domestically based 
development dynamic. Its 40% pastoral population have historically had very poor access to 
basic services, high vulnerability and limited communications with governmental and 
external actors. This remains true today because - quite probably appropriately and even 
necessarily - basic service rehabilitation (by the Somaliland government, international 
agencies such as UNICEF and UNCTAD and NGO ’s such as ICD/CIIR) has focused on the 
urban 30% of the people.
IDS believes a participatory, contextually grounded approach to rehabilitation is integral to 
successful outcomes - not least in the case of pastoralists in Somaliland. One size does not fit 
all because historical, political, conflictual, economic and availability of external cooperating 
resources vary tremendously from context to context. That is true both geographically and 
over time. What is priority and practicable in Somaliland today is more than and different 
from what might be in the varying fragments of Somalia and also more today than what 
would have been possible before the National Council mediation process created a broadly 
based widely accepted as legitimate by Somalilanders state.
The proposed programme focuses on development of contextually linked data and projects 
with its own personnel (Somali and expatriate) acting to catalyse and to provide a forum for 
data collection - analysis - linkage to action not as to serve importers and imposers of 
’solutions’. Consultation should be built up among all actors from pastoral lineage groups 
through broader civil society bodies and government departments to international actors.
Content matters because without it process becomes empty and unsustainable. In the case of 
Somaliland’s pastoralists health, water, veterinary services, education, gender relations 
and disablement (including its prevention by mine location and avoidance as well as 
demining) can be identified as content priorities. How much data exists toward detailed 
formulations and the balance between reconstructive rehabilitation of what once existed and 
has been lost and forward rehabilitation developing new content from pastoral priorities and 
capacities varies widely. For example in health and veterinary services programmes based 
on nomadic pastoralist provision of personnel for training by government departments to 
perform paramedical and para veterinary roles could greatly extend pastoralist access. In the 
case of health it would restore it as over 1950-1987 such a service existed with state/donor 
handling of drug procurement, stock holding and distribution to donors as well as training
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and monitoring of personnel. The communities paid their own paramedicals and a substantial 
portion of the basic drug cost. In the veterinary and water areas parallel programming is 
worth exploring. In education various approaches including pastoral work year friendly 
school timetabling and closer interaction with Koranic schools appear worth closer study. 
Demining and mine identification and avoidance in pastoral areas are not dissimilar issues 
in principle but require more dialogue on pastoralist priorities and potentials and available 
technology and acquisition of the knowledge power to use it by para and non-professionals.
IDS proposes to draw on the experience of and to work with ICD/CIIR, UNICEF and other 
successful external actors in Somaliland. Its core personnel for this proposed programme are 
Professor Reginald Herbold Green who has substantial experience with Somalia/Somaliland 
from 1987 and Dr. Ismail I. Ahmed who is a Somali with Somaliland pastoral kin links and 
relevant pastoral need and capacity analyses experience in Somaliland and the adjacent Haud 
area of Ethiopia.
THE CHALLENGE
About 50% of the population (1.8-2.0 million) of Somaliland are semi-nomadic pastoralists, 
30% urban residents (dominantly in the capital Hargeisa) and at most 20% settled pastoral- 
orchard-field farmers. The pastoral economy was devastated by the 1987-1991 war waged by 
the then Barre Government against the Somalilanders who (like the United Republic of 
Somalia’s own High Court) never accepted the legitimacy of Som alia’s de facto  take-over of 
The Republic of Somaliland (1960). The war resulted in high mortality and displacement to 
Ethiopia both among pastoralists and their herds. While the pastoralists have largely 
returned, the restoration of cattle, probably camel and to a lesser extent sheep and goat 
population remains incomplete and, both grazing and orchard restoration are plagued by land 
mines left from the war.
Basic public services to pastoralists - except in the late (1945-60) British colonial period - 
have been exiguous. In its declining years the Barre regime nearly ceased to provide water, 
veterinary, livestock and health services, anywhere outside Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo 
with the then Northwest (ex-British Somaliland/Republic of Somaliland - 1960) especially 
disfavoured as well as devastated by war, mines and forced migration.
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Service restoration by the post 1991 government in Hargeisa (which perceives itself as the 
lineal descendant of the 1960 Republic of Somaliland as does its public service) has been 
significant despite personnel and financial constraints and those posed by lack of 
international recognition (with the important informal but de fac to  exception of Ethiopia).
In the case of water urban restoration has been achieved, initially through an international 
agency/NGO coalition led by UNICEF for capital works and training. Maintenance, and 
operation are now increasingly carried on by the Ministry of W ater and by municipal 
authorities. However, rural water provision, in particular restoration of boreholes, spring 
protection, birkets and other sources used by pastoralists, has lagged badly. In part this 
relates to imperfect interaction among pastoralist groups and the Ministry.
In health very substantial restoration of primary services - especially preventative child and 
mother ones - has been achieved. Indeed for urban and settled rural groups they are above 
1980’s standards and - contrary to that period - are led by a competent, concerned Ministry of 
Health backed by UNICEF and the EU. However, the Somaliland para professional basic 
health outreach programme to pastoralists not at base villages has yet to be restored partly 
because of loss of historic memory (and nearly the entire official written record).
Education’s revival has been slower but substantial in respect to state (quite possibly back to 
1985 effective enrolment levels) and Koranic schools. However, state primary schools 
probably never enrolled more than 10% of pastoral household children (and a majority of 
them through their staying with urban relatives). Koranic schools - with nomadic band based 
and paid teachers - had and have a broader pastoral outreach. However despite mutual 
willingness to cooperate, the Ministry of Education and Koranic school leaders have yet to 
devise effective means of cooperation to render the two systems complementary and mutually 
reinforcing.
The Ministry of Livestock and Veterinary Affairs is a priority one in Somaliland. It is, 
however, rebuilding from virtual dissolution of services and data collection during the late 
Barre period and near total loss of records. Late 1980’s proposals for a cooperative state - 
pastoralist para veterinary service were stillborn because of the 1987-91 war and have yet to 
be revived. In volume terms rural water is also primarily a livestock issue. At macro level 
the restoration of an internationally recognised quarantine facility at the Port of Berbera is 
crucial to pastoral household welfare because it could lead to the reversal of a long standing
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Saudi ban on Somaliland (including Northeast Ethiopian) shipped cattle and the recently 
imposed one on sheep and goats. The lifting of the ban could raise the cash incomes of 
Somaliland (and Northeast Ethiopian pastoralists) by a fifth to a third because the Saudi 
market pays more than those of Yemen (including Aden) and costs of shipping to Oman and 
the Emirates are much higher.
Pastoralist women and girls are especially disadvantaged by the poor health service and 
water access because they bear the burden of caring for sick persons and of collecting water. 
They are already particularly hard hit by the impact of the war which has raised the 
proportion of female headed households - albeit particularly in urban and settled rural areas.
Disabled persons - particularly but not only ex-combatants - are known to face severe 
handicaps in respect to survival and restoration of livelihoods. These are probably 
particularly severe in pastoral contexts because of the difficulties of their performing 
traditional livelihood tasks.
Civil society/state relations in Somaliland are not hostile. Nor is there the near absence of 
civil society bodies often attributed to Africa. The state-civil society positive relationship 
turns on two factors. First the majority of Somalilanders increasingly viewed the Barre 
regime as an occupying force and the struggle against it as a liberation war which was to a 
significant extent spearheaded by historic civil groups. As a result the recreated Somaliland 
state enjoys the window of opportunity common to liberation governments. Second the basis 
for the new state and its government was negotiated by a national (including all clan and sub­
clan groups) assembly of elders and is therefore based on a civil society consensus. In these 
respects it is in a radically different position vis a vis civil society than pertains in any of the 
(divergent) successor proto statelets in Somalia.
Civil society in Somaliland is based on lineage, religious and w om en’s groups. These are 
often overlooked in Northern evaluations of the strength of civil society. The former UN 
Secretary G eneral’s Special Representative for Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, believed 
empowering support for civil society could lead to a positive resolution of the 1991 crisis.
His resignation resulted from international community (and, predictably, Somali warlord) 
unwillingness to explore and act on that perception. Mosques, wom en’s groups lineage 
groups/blood groups, pastoral bands and base villages and a veterans group (covering the 
spectrum from British through Barre to present government ex soldiers) are significant in
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Somaliland. However, there is no sustained history of operational partnership among them - 
at least since 1960. This now results in overlooking opportunities for state - civil society 
partnership or in not being able to identify ways to render them operational. This perception 
problem is serious for many international agencies and N G O ’s. Somaliland religious and 
pastoral groups are usually overlooked because they are so different from Northern 
development or cause linked NGO ’s.
In personal consumption terms most Somali pastoralists do not live in absolute poverty. The 
combination of self produced food (notably cam els’milk), revenue from livestock sales and 
remittances from overseas family members have been restored to levels averting that. 
However, access to basic services beyond law and order - health, education, water, veterinary 
and markets - are abysmal. Except in the 1950’s (and the special case of Koranic schools) 
this has always characterised Somaliland. The barriers to health, education and water access 
for pastoralists are increased by arid, harsh terrain, scattered population and limited state 
financial and personnel resources. The market access limitations do not centre on cartelised 
traders or even transporters but on the ill repair of key road links and the absence of Berbera 
quarantine facilities.
In addition to - and in part because of - limited basic services access, pastoralists - even if not 
poor - are vulnerable. Drought cycles are recurrent and inevitably lead to loss of flocks and 
herds - and therefore future livelihoods. Food aid does not meet this challenge nor does the 
return of rain. As a pastoralist observed to a reporter "The rains have brought back the grass 
but they will not bring back my dead camels" i.e. my cash income stream and my family’s 
staple milk. Lineage group and band safety nets do allow recovery (via core herd loans 
repaid in kind) but only when the overall loss level is not too high. Lack of basic veterinary 
drugs and of rural water infrastructure increases losses. This is particularly true of the half of 
livestock losses associated with drought which occur when the return of rains - with cooler 
air and wetter food - leads to massive diarrhoeal and lung disease losses. Analogously lack 
of access to basic medical services increases family vulnerability to avoidable and curable 
diseases including these linked to micro nutritional deficiencies (e.g. iodine/goitre; 
iron/anaemia).
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TOW ARD AN EM POW ERING RESPONSE
In Somaliland, and especially for pastoralists, the response to challenges of poverty and 
vulnerability needs to build on civil society/state cooperation in shared, coordinated action. 
Some responsibilities will fall primarily on the state (including local government) e.g. urban 
water and importation/stocking of basic drugs. Others need to be collaborative e.g. the 
restoration of law and order with a state civilian police/magisterial court system backed by 
the authority of the National Council of Elders, and supported by an overwhelming majority 
of Somali landers.
Key initiatives will require primarily pastoral group/civil society operated programmes 
supported - with training, materials, in part finance - by the state and international agencies. 
There is a limited history of such interaction (health, education and most water facilities as 
well as livestock services beyond pre export veterinary checks outside Berbera and Hargeisa 
are almost totally a post 1945 development, decayed from the later 1970’s and were virtually 
obliterated over 1987-91). Therefore, a significant catalysing role - both in respect to pastoral 
groups and to the state - potentially does exist for external NGO ’s with knowledge of, 
experience with and respect for civil society/state interaction in basic service provision and 
vulnerability reduction in other developing countries and a basic working knowledge of and 
respect for Somaliland, Somalilanders and their organisations.
Such catalytic and supporting efforts are welcomed by many Somalilanders and their 
Government. That welcome requires that they are perceived as supportive, related to 
Somalilanders’needs and goals and respectful. Respectful in this sense includes treating 
government institutions and officials as such, Islamic groups as culturally central and worthy 
of a certain deference and understanding, pastoralism and its groups as a viable, relatively 
sophisticated life and livelihood pattern needing understanding and cooperation. "One size 
fits all" preaching and eradication by transformation approaches are likely to be both 
unworkable and unacceptable. The near exclusion of UNOSOM from Somaliland and the 
hostile or frosty relations with some international agencies and N G O ’s bear witness to this 
reality. So too do the broadly cordial and productive relationships with, e.g. UNICEF,
UNDP, DFID and ICD/CIIR. Instant entry/uniform solution imported approaches both raise 
hostility or at least serious reservations and are likely to be counterproductive because they
are not based on Somaliland realities as perceived by Somalilanders nor built up in 
participatory dialogue with their civil society and governmental institutions.
To play such a role, an external group (or for that matter an internal one) will need:
a. to develop more detailed baseline data in respect to health, education, water, livelihood 
and market access issues specifically related to pastoralists, to gender and to disability;
b. to build up articulated knowledge of the types, present functions, capacities (and 
limitations) and goals/potentials for further development of civil society groups ranging 
from pastoral bands through mosques to women’s groups;
c. in participatory association with these groups and relevant state institutions draw up a set 
of priority interventions which could have significant access to services and vulnerability 
reduction impact and foster pastoralist - state interaction. They would need to be 
sustainable by Somaliland actors after the limited initial external personnel and resource 
interventions;
d. and set up a network to carry out the programme of interventions.
Present knowledge of Somaliland is not adequate to short circuit this process by a running 
start in programming. Somaliland - and even more Somalia - is littered with the rusting ruins 
of such efforts. This is particularly true in respect to civil society based approaches because 
data on their nature, capacities and aspirations is even more fragmentary than on poverty, 
economy service access or government activities.
Therefore the most appropriate programme is in two stages:
a. a 15 month data collection, participatory priority setting, network developing, project 
initiation phase;
b. followed by 36 months of operating, monitoring, feedback and evaluation.
The problem with, as well as an integral strength of this, approach is that while the broad 
problem areas/concerns and relevant civil society/state institutions can be identified now, 
exact networks, priorities and individual themes/projects for stage two necessarily emerge 
during, and out of participation, listening and dialogue in stage one.
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THE PROPOSAL
The Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) proposes:
a. an 18 month data collection, participatory institutional study, programme articulation and 
network development stage March 1999-May 2000 (£200,000) to being/March 1999;
b. a 36 month joint operational programme with identified Somaliland civil society bodies 
and Government institutions June 2000-May 2003 (£600,000).
IDS has substantial experience in research consultancy and operational programme advising 
in respect to poverty and its reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition it has researchers 
and programmes in respect to pastoralism, gender and participation. Its personnel in respect 
to Somaliland are Professor Reginald Herbold Green and Dr. Ismail Ahmed. Reg Green has 
studied Somalia/Somaliland and has done three analytical programme oriented field studies 
for UNICEF in 1987, 1993 and 1995. Dr. Ahmed - a Somali with Somaliland/Haud kinship 
roots has completed a PhD (focused on food security in Somaliland and the adjacent the 
Haud area in Ethiopia's Somali Region) from the University of London - and has done 
research at IDS on the social impact of economic crises and adjustment to them. He is now 
based in Somaliland and Somalia working on issues of state reconstruction, social 
reconciliation and - especially - social/economic/political rehabilitation in the Complex 
Political Emergency Project in collaboration with Leeds, Bradford and ACCORD. Reg 
Green is the leader in work on COPE analysis of rehabilitation in Somalia/Somaliland, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea and Uganda/Rwanda and a senior advisor to the African Centre for 
Development, Economic and Strategic Studies' (based in Ijedu-Ode Nigeria and headed by 
Professor Adebayo Adedeji) ongoing project on Conflict Comprehension and Mastering.]
IDS is in discussion with International Cooperation in Development/CIIR in respect to co­
involvement in recruiting and training Somali and expatriate development workers and in 
building dialogue and empowering relationships with Somali actors. Four to six of them will 
- especially in the operational stage - be the key to the success of the programme both in 
immediate delivery terms and, especially, in creating a Somali civil society and government 
ongoing service provision - cooperation dynamic.
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ICD/CIIR has substantial data collection evaluation and analysis and of field operational 
activity allied to and aimed at empowering civil society groups and government units 
providing basic services in a number of countries including Yemen and Somalia/Somaliland. 
At present it has both Somali and expatriate development workers collaborating with Somali 
NGO’s and the Ministry of Health - to date largely in urban areas - and is co-sponsoring a 
major international conference on Somaliland/Somalia in October in Hargeisa which Dr. 
Ahmed and Professor Green will attend. The programme proposed here would complement, 
not compete with, their ongoing work which is at present basically urban focused relating and 
responding to the needs of that 40% of Somaliland’s people.
A. project by another Northern NGO in Erigavo indicates by its limited results that instant 
entry with limited baseline data either on the pastoral/small town contexts, on the patterns of 
civil society or on the capacities and bases of Somali partners yields very limited results.
This is compounded if interaction to limited to a brief initial and briefer annual visits. 
Therefore IDS proposes to follow an initially slower but more structured and participatory 
approach.
a. reviewing data in hand from previous work by, inter alia, IDS, ICD and UNICEF (IDS’ 
baseline paper for the Rehabilitation in Somalia/Somaliland portion of the COPE project 
is appended);
b. feeding in the data flow from ID S’ COPE work (which includes a rural survey 
component) ICD’s ongoing urban health and civil society empowerment work and the 
October 1998 National W orkshop as well as that from involvement in ACDESS’ongoing 
comprehension and mastery of conflict project;
c. from March 1999 through August 2000 IDS will use two senior personnel each for four 
to six months in the UK and, especially, Somaliland in association with two to four 
Somali personnel to lead and coordinate data collection, programme articulation and 
network build-up;
d. March-May 2000 would focus on network and participatory programme prioritisation and 
articulation including participatory and training workshops drawing in other IDS and ICD 
personnel experienced in these areas;
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e. in March 1999 a field office headed by a Somali Research Officer would be established to 
carry on an ongoing programme possibly including specific field level surveys or 
participatory workshops led by one or two Somali Research Assistants. The existing IDS 
COPE project office could form the base for this element in the project;
f. operational programming over June 2000 - May 2003 would entail continued use of 
(possibly different) senior IDS, and potentially ICD, personnel on a two to four month a 
year basis and four to six development workers (at least half Somalis) to carry on 
programme support, liaison and coordination operations in Somaliland;
g. in addition to operational and catalytic liaison with and coordination among pastoral 
people’s civil society and Somaliland government units, the project would seek to 
coordinate and facilitate beneficiary, domestic and external resource mobilisation to 
achieve longer term sustainability and expansion. Preliminary information suggests this 
is a realistic aim. Most Somaliland pastoralists are not absolutely poor and both can and 
would contribute toward programmes they perceived as demonstrably valuable to them
e.g. water, paramedical and paraveterinary. Because of their - historically well founded - 
reservations as to government and external actor intentions and capabilities these 
contributions will build up as programmes demonstrate that they are pastoral user friendly 
and basically Somaliland owned and operated. Similarly in respect to training and basic 
drugs it is highly likely that UNICEF and the EU would support a properly articulated set 
of interventions. The EU and possible DFID and Italy, as well as UNCTAD are relevant 
to quarantine facility and arterial highway/port rehabilitation which are complementary 
initiatives highly relevant to reducing pastoral poverty and vulnerability, but quite beyond 
the direct personnel, technical knowledge or financial capacities of the proposed project 
as such.
TOW ARD PROGRAMME ARTICULATION
The reasons for not attempting a detailed articulation of the 2000-2003 implementation stage 
have been set out: inadequate baseline data on present conditions, institutional priorities and 
limitations and especially the need for a more participatory process of prioritisation and 
selection. However, the main themes and areas of concern can be identified:
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a. Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Future Conflict Reduction;
b. Poverty - and especially Vulnerability - reduction;
c. Primary Human Health;
d. Primary Animal Health;
e. Water for households and livestock;
f. Education;
g. Gender concerns;
h. Rehabilitation for Disabled persons.
With the possible exception of disabled persons, the focus will be primarily on pastoralists 
and secondarily on agro pastoralists whose livestock component of household income is 
dominant and many of whom are semi nomadic. The possible exception arises because 
although a majority of disabled persons (primarily from war and mines) are former 
pastoralists, it is not clear either physical or livelihood rehabilitation is practicable within the 
pastoral context.
CONFLICT
Somaliland is a post conflict state and society. Law and order - based on functioning courts 
and a civilian police force as well as a small army - now exists. With the more or less 
negotiated "no winners/no losers" end to the Burao insurgency (which was about degree of 
influence in the government, not secession), there are no major conflicts. In the National 
Council of Elders and Assembly-Cabinet-Public Service (6,000 including police but 
excluding army) there is a government structure backed by both historic and modem sources 
of legitimacy and capable of contributing to basic service delivery.
However, the wounds of past conflict remain and - especially at local level - peace is fragile 
(as it has always been in the Horn). The post conflict rehabilitation theme directly relevant to 
pastoral people (given the near absence of public services accessible to them in the 1980’s) is 
reduction of the threat posed and constriction of livelihood caused by mines. More data is
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needed on how serious risks and costs these pose today, what domestic capacity could be 
extended to pastoral area and which catalytic external inputs could be secured and are desired 
(Somaliland has had very bad experience with UNOSOM funded mine raising companies).
Local clashes in Somaliland are dominantly over access to water and secondarily over 
grazing rights. Improvement of access to water for flocks and herds is probably the most 
crucial means to reducing their incidence, just as traditional mediation and effective policing 
are to containing individual incidents. In addition strengthened health, veterinary and 
educational services would increase social stability and state legitimacy in conflict reducing 
ways.
Neither civil (intra Somaliland) nor external (with Ethiopia or Somalia) war are probable. 
There is a "Somaliland idea" which does have real resonance and past insurgencies around 
Burao and Berbera and near Hargeisa appear to have been resolved by mediation/negotiation. 
Relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia (including its Somali Region as well as Addis) 
are good and centre on transit trade which is mutually valuable undergirded by civil society 
kinship group relations. Past conflict was not between Somalilanders and closely related 
Somalis in Ethiopia but between the then Addis and Mogadishu regimes and 
Haud/Somaliland Som ali’s (in particular Isaaq). Somaliland and Somalia are separated by a 
wide swath of near desert with minimal human use (even by Somali standards) Somaliland 
has no territorial ambitions and no Somalia political grouping gives serious priority to 
conquest of Somaliland (or has the capacity to reach Somaliland in any force if it did). 
Therefore, Somaliland is unlikely to be involved in fighting with its southern/eastern 
neighbour(s).
POVERTY/VULNERABILITY
Most Somaliland pastoralists do not fall below an absolute poverty line nor are they severely 
malnourished. These generalisations hold except in the cases of full scale war (1987-91) and 
multi year severe drought (e.g. 1983-84).
However, pastoral households at micro level are highly vulnerable to livestock loss (local 
weather or disease) and to incidents of poor health(accident or illness calamities). These - if 
numerous - erode pastoral community (band, village, blood group) ability to provide historic
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work and livestock sharing safety nets. In drought years whole communities (not necessarily 
the whole pastoral population as Horn droughts usually have very uneven incidence and the 
core Hargeisa-Borama highland area is less drought prone) are vulnerable especially because 
of the deterioration of rural access to water and the absence - especially post drought - of 
veterinary services/drugs.
Better access to water, veterinary services, preventative and primary medical care and 
demining would raise productivity and thereby both reduce poverty overall and enhance the 
capacity of communal coping mechanisms to deal with individual calamity cases. So would 
better market access. The keys to that are full rehabilitation of the Port of Berbera 
(especially its quarantine facility), of the trunk Berbera-Hargeisa-Borama-Ethiopia highway 
and probably of the Hargeisa-Burao-Erigavo secondary highway. Physically and financially 
these are far beyond the scope of the project, but building pastoral networks and 
demonstrating pastoral people’s development capabilities could strengthen the government’s 
focus on them and especially its ability to mobilise external agency financial and technical 
support.
Human health service access by pastoralists is very limited. Health posts and clinics 
increasingly do exist in small towns and larger villages but are not readily accessible to 
perhaps half the population of Somaliland including the vast majority of pastoralists. 
Vaccination campaigns have somewhat greater outreach but - like emergency evacuation to 
static facilities - are hampered by lack of ongoing contact.
This situation does not result from lack of pastoralist or Ministry of Health concern. It is not 
unique to Somaliland, but common to most sub-Saharan African pastoral communities. 
However, in Somaliland an effective pastoral community/health authority outreach system 
based on pastoral community chosen/health service trained paramedical personnel, central 
supply of basic drugs, and shared costs did exist. It was built by the British administration in 
the 1940’s. After 1960 it was to a degree continued by Somalia’s Ministry of Health but 
eroded badly in the late 1970’s. In the mid 1980’s it was partially revived under donor 
(largely UNICEF in the then Northwest) auspices but was swept away in the 1987-91 war.
Its revival is crucial. The main elements are:
a. community selection of part time health workers;
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b. 6 to 13 week training as paramedicals - first aid, diagnosis and provision of basic drugs 
for common diseases;
c. provision of a free initial stock of basic drugs and of replacement supplies at cost;
d. community payment (largely in kind) of workers for services;
e. monitoring by Ministry field staff.
To these could - and should - be added:
f. linkage to vaccination campaigns;
g. basic health and sanitation education (to be carried out by paramedicals with supporting 
graphic and pictorial material)
h. parallel midwife training for ’traditional’ midwives;
i. provision of a communication facility (radio telephone?) to allow paramedical personnel 
to secure advice and/or evacuation in cases beyond their abilities;
j. more systematic monitoring and data collection feedback.
Network building and training are key to reviving this service. It is clear UNICEF and 
probably EU would be willing to provide material and training support. The Ministry is 
concerned, but because after 1980 the surviving programme elements were donor managed 
has few - if any - personnel with an historic memory and also needs articulated sensitisation 
and training.
Other health initiatives important to pastoral people include iodisation of salt to reduce the 
high incidence of goitre in some area. However, it is hard to see how this could be done 
except as an aspect of a Community/Ministry partnership programme involving including salt 
in basic drug’ kit at subsidised prices, because salt production is artisinal and present trade 
largely in small (uniodised) lots from the Gulf and Eritrea.
Livestock Health is vital to pastoralist nutrition and income. There has since 1992 been 
rehabilitation (indeed recreation) of the relevant Ministry. Like Health, its present Budget 
(constrained as it is) is very substantially larger than that of the former United Republic’s 
services in the then Northwest. As with human health, access problems are severe.
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Vaccination and dipping can be provided at base villages in the dry season. Field outreach is 
much more difficult.
The most promising way forward would appear to be a pastoral community/Ministry 
partnership analogous to that for human health. This was envisaged by UNICEF in 1987 but 
the eruption of full scale war that year made it impracticable. An education programme as 
well as articulation would be needed because - unlike human health - there is no historical 
precedent and therefore no memories of a better former state of affairs to be regained.
In respect to veterinary drugs, it is argued that five or six (including rock salt) are crucial and 
that their use and the diagnosis of the most common diseases are well known to pastoralists. 
Since the 1960’s, however, they have been increasingly unavailable through either state or 
private channels. Drugs can probably play only a marginal role in reducing livestock loss 
during drought, though a more substantial one in normal years. Their key role is at the 
periods when droughts break and the air becomes cooler and moister and green pasturage 
replaces dried out remnants. These changes lead to respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases which 
result in massive deaths among drought weakened herds and reduced survival of newly bom 
animals.
Because demand would apparently fluctuate sharply - neither the timing of droughts nor, 
especially, of their breaking are subject to exact projection - national (or more probably four 
to six regional) back-up supply depots might well be needed. Once a programme was 
articulated and launched with pastoralist and state support, it appears highly probable donors 
would readily finance setting these up as well as augmenting Ministry budgetary allocations 
for ongoing supplies, training and logistical support.
W ater is central to Somali and especially pastoral Somali concerns. It is for scarcer and 
riskier than land or even food to pastoral, desert margin cultures water and security of access 
to it are socially, humanly and economically central.
Cooperative pastoral group/village community (overlapping but not identical) and Ministry 
action are practicable. Exactly what is workable, where needs further explorations.
Key highway, livestock transit point and villages stream or pond protection, restoration, 
exploitation of middle level wells and pumped boreholes (a last resort because of fuel and 
spares costs) are often viable on the basis of user charges. Ministry advising/extending,
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drilling and checking on maintenance (to avert breakdowns) can link to pastoralist 
preventative and simple repair maintenance and operation with post installation costs (except 
in severe drought years) met by users through whatever collection system suits them best 
(including fees to outside users of water points on livestock transit routes or highways). 
Because in Somaliland (and Somalia) all water rights are owned, neither paying to develop 
and maintain nor ’hiring’access and partial use of water sources to outside users are alien or 
even unusual concepts. They are facilitative in the rural pastoral context even if less so in 
respect to communities residing on urban well fields.
Distinctions between human and livestock water in the pastoral Somaliland context are 
unreal. Both are essential and in practice will come from the same source. This does create a 
need for pollution control/sanitation education in respect of ponds and open wells and, more 
especially, separate off-take taps for human consumption, washing and livestock. These are 
comprehensible to and manageable by Somalis, as evidenced in Baidoa and urban Somaliland 
cases, but are not widely practised elsewhere. That implies an education/training programme 
need, especially as the exceptions appear to have been initiated by UNICEF design and 
educational efforts then carried on by municipal operators and by users.
Education of pastoralists is notoriously weak and Somaliland is not an exception. However, 
pastoral literacy is higher than might be expected because of the early 1970’s adult literacy 
campaign which at that time joined water and veterinary services as genuinely nationally 
(although less so in the Northwest) accessible services before their 1980’s erosion to collapse.
Somali pastoralists do value education but have difficulty relating to standard pedagogical 
models:
a. fixed point schools are not readily accessible to most pastoral children most of the year;
b. boys are - or are seen to be - integral to the herding of livestock;
c. education is valued for its contribution to livelihood and development which in the case 
of urban oriented, standard subject rote learning is perhaps less than self evident;
d. school years unrelated to rural work cycles (unlike 19th Century European/North 
American ones whose vacations were linked to peak agricultural requirements) increase 
the opportunity cost of attendance.
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One approach deserving exploration is determining how many boys are in base villages at 
least four months a year. On the face of it, a school year keyed to these four months should 
enhance enrolment.
For potential pupils in bands without, or absent from, base villages, the only practicable 
answer would appear to be mobile schools - i.e. the teacher packs the classroom materials and 
his residence on a camel and rides with the other pastoralists (few non pastoralists would seek 
such a job). There is no secular school experience in Somaliland with this approach, but it 
deserves exploration as to feasibility and demand at least as to literacy and basic numeracy 
linked with adult/continuing education in veterinary practices, human health and sanitation, 
nutrition, education. Literate pastoralists selected (and subsequently paid) by their groups for 
13 to 26 weeks basic training and provided with texts and exercise materials may be a way 
forward. No one could pretend this to be high quality or broad scope education but it is a step 
forward and one on the face of it consistent with pastoralists’ goals and their 
environmental/livelihood constraints.
There is a school system which pastoralists do utilise which follows practices akin to those 
suggested. This is the Koranic School system which has both six month residential schools 
run by sheikhs and peripatetic pastoral schools with less fully qualified ulema.
Increasingly Koranic Schools - at least in urban areas - have evinced interest in broadening 
their curriculum to literacy in Somali (and reading - as contrasted with memorising and 
reproducing the Arabic text - the Holy Koran in Somali), written numeracy, in a few cases 
Arabic and/or English. This suggests a potential fruitful alliance of government and Koranic 
schools especially as the latter have more outreach to pastoralists and, in general, a lower 
average age of pupils.
One route would be to provide teacher training, classroom materials and texts (including the 
Somali translation of the Holy Koran which is apparently out of print) and - at least in the 
case or urban schools construction and staff salary -cost sharing to Koranic Schools. They 
would then teach basic literacy, numeracy and socialisation with other children in a four year 
basic curriculum still centred on the Koran. Public middle schools could then begin at year 
three or four of the present (tentative) Ministry syllabus while there would be a parallel user 
and mosque supported advanced Koranic School structure for the limited numbers remaining 
for more than four years. For the avoidance of doubt it needs to be noted that over a third of
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Koranic school pupils are girls - a proportion similar to that in government schools in 
Somaliland today as it was in the then United Republic of Somalia in 1987.
Gender issue priorities as raised by Somaliland women’s organisations can be listed: access 
to livelihood, education, health services, the public service (which has historically been 
almost exclusively male except for nurses and secretaries), peace and ending female 
circumcision (female genital mutilation). However, it must be noted that Somaliland w om en’s 
organisations’outreach to rural villages - let alone to more nomadic pastoralist women- is, as 
yet, negligible. Therefore, to be effective in partnership with women’s groups the project will 
need to build in support for an educational and extension exercise by Somaliland wom en’s 
organisations to village (including pastoralist "home base" village) women.
There is a parallel need to build up more specific knowledge of livelihood and education as 
they relate to the needs of pastoral women. The interactions are likely to be complex - as is 
the situation of women in Somaliland more generally - and in many respects distinct in form 
from urban concerns.
Somaliland women have virtually no direct political role (albeit they formally could be - but 
at present are not - in the national assembly, cabinet and senior public service). However, 
because marriage is virtually always inter-blood group and often inter-subclan, married 
women are by definition members of two groups and play a recognised role in the 
exploratory phases of dispute mediation. Women can and do, under Somaliland law and 
Islamic custom in Somaliland and Somalia seek and secure divorce with custody of children 
on stated grounds including non-support and physical abuse. They have for decades held a 
significant share of urban micro and small commerce and more recently have moved up to 
larger scale businesses. In the private sector (including migrant labour) the proportion of 
female employees is rising (they do not chew khat - as on the whole pastoralists both male 
and female do not). In the public sector change has been glacial, partly because there were 
more trained, experienced male ex public servants than the 4,000 non-police posts.
Pastoral women do have the right to secure income from the sale of some pastoral and 
agricultural products - not camels and cattle and rarely cam els’ milk or live goats and sheep - 
but how much this production, processing, trading amounts to or how it could be augmented 
requires further study.
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Formal education is unusual - especially beyond 2-4 years - among pastoral women, 
literacy less so. As many desire to work abroad languages (Arabic, English and perhaps 
French), non-Somali cooking and housekeeping are sought after skills. W hether these - 
together with health, nutrition and sanitation awareness and techniques - could be taught at 
least in villages is worth exploring.
Similarly in respect to midwives, paramedical personnel for village linked agro-pastoralists 
and pastoralists there is reason to suppose pastoral communities would nominate women (by 
definition in the case of midwives, to treat women and children in the paramedical case) 
although this is unlikely at present for paraveterinary personnel.
Female health problems - including the general burden of caring for sick persons - are better 
known. Somaliland has a high incidence of anaemia and of goitre. The first is linked to one 
of the world’s highest maternal mortality rates. That rate is also in part the consequence of 
female genital mutilation/circumcision which is still universal among pastoralists.
Paramedical outreach (which could include child weight monitoring and nutrition) could 
lower and lessen the average duration of morbidity reducing w om en’s workload. It may be 
that iron tablets and iodised salt could be channelled in this way (almost certainly initially 
free as there is limited present pastoral knowledge of, or demand for, them).
Female circumcision requires a different approach. Its most determined opponents are 
women’s groups led by educated, urban women with no direct pastoral links. However, in 
urban areas it has now reached the general social agenda because the reduction of isolation 
and increase of education of many Islamic clerics has led to several stating that female 
circumcision is not merely not required by the Holy Koran, but is at least implicitly forbidden 
by, or inconsistent with, it. The initial thrust for change will inevitably focus on Hargeisa and 
Berbera plus perhaps Burao, Boramo and other secondary towns until w om en’s organisations 
have real rural links and more rural sheikhs are educated in broader currents of Islamic 
theology and social doctrine.
Disabled persons - unless members of relatively well off households - are poor as well as 
physically and psychologically damaged. Because a majority were pastoralists, they are of 
concern to pastoral communities. There is an effective veterans’ (UK through present 
government) association which is directly concerned on behalf of disabled people.
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However, it is relatively hard to work out how most disabled pastoral men can be reintegrated 
into pastoral livelihoods - urban would appear less daunting. Further artificial limb/hand 
fitting would need to be in clinics with some recuperative therapy and would therefore part of 
a national - not just a pastoralist - programme. Here, as in the case of gender, a more and 
more articulated database needs to be developed before searching for prioritising and 
articulating programmatic priorities.
The evident exception is demining, the vulnerability reduction or preventative side of 
confronting disability. High technology approaches can cost up to $1,000 per mine when 
these are scattered randomly and in unknown locations over extensive rural areas. The 
likelihood £1,000,000,000 could be mobilised internationally for such an approach is very 
low, realistically negligible.
A more community based, best available means approached focused on identification and 
avoidance needs to be sought. Middle level technology approaches by Somalis have had 
some success in concentrated, roughly known urban and main road minefields. Beyond that 
knowledge of what has worked elsewhere on identification avoidance and selective demining 
needs to be presented for interaction with pastoral priorities and perceived capabilities in 
conjunction with limited state and external support. While such an approach has had 
substantial results in the extreme North of Mozambique it cannot be imported/replicated 
without participatory dialogue and modification because the Mozambican mines were in 
border minefields whose location and extent were at least roughly known.
It is impossible to guarantee in advance that a fully effective approach can be built up. 
However, given the ongoing human and economic costs of mines it is imperative to try. If a 
relatively low cost practicable approach can be identified funds for two to four pilot areas 
could almost certainly be mobilised. The results would be valuable beyond the immediate 
beneficiaries in Somaliland not least in Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, M ozambique and in the 
future Angola and Sudan. Training in identification, avoidance and (relatively) safe disposal 
should be taught if 6 week courses can produce para professional mine identifiers and 
eradicators.
It is possible that initial baseline data collection and analysis and pastoral group network 
building will identify additional priority areas which would then be taken into account. It is 
not, however, probable as the main themes of Somalilander - including pastoralist - privations
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and priorities have been relatively frequently expressed and (with account for urban/rural 
differences) are relatively uniformly presented to sympathetic investigators/cooperating 
partners.
The programme cannot hope to achieve breakthroughs in all proposed areas even apart 
from personnel and resource constraints. Therefore part of the initial stage work will involve 
- in full consultation with Somaliland partners - prioritising three to five with foundation 
building work toward post project action in two or three more. Similarly activity (beyond 
outreach to inform other actors and areas) cannot be in more than two to four districts.
The catalytic impact of the programme if successful should be substantial. By the third year 
£1.0 to £1.5 million each from Somaliland government funds (in veterinary-health-livestock- 
water), external agency/donor support (e.g. UNICEF, UNCTAD, EU, DFID) and pastoralist 
contributions (e.g. human and veterinary drugs, payment of paramedical, paraveterinary and 
educational personnel and contributions in labour and materials) would appear feasible. £3.0 
to £4.5 million is not a huge sum, but at £3.25 to £5.0 per pastoralist it would represent at 
least a doubling of health-education-water-veterinary services now accessible to them. 
Further by strengthening pastoral and other civil society bodies and the delivery capacity of 
the Somaliland government and broadening their cooperation with external partners it could 
lay the bases for sustainability and further advance.
The proposed programme is presented as justified in terms of its potential direct benefits to 
pastoralists, their civil society groupings and the Somaliland state. Its would not be directly 
replicable elsewhere. However, the broader value of a successful community/civil 
society/participation approach to rehabilitation, reconciliation and vulnerability reduction 
after violent conflict and state disintegration in Somaliland could be substantial. One size 
does not fit all but insites, processual guidelines, indications of what will probably work (and 
equally important what probably won't) and checklists of potential priority topics from one 













Data collection/analysis; organisational contact build-up and 
capacity assessment
Initial Baseline Report
Workshop with Potential Somaliland Partners
Articulation of Operational Phase
Draft Programme of Action
Workshops with Partners 
Operational Programme of Action
Training and Participation 
Workshop prelude to Implementation
Stage 2 Commencement




Phase 1 (15-18 months) £200,000
• Senior Personnel (Fellow/Research Officer) and IDS Support 75,000
(8 to 10 months)
• Somali Staff (2) 20,000
Additional Programme Development Staff 15,000
• International and Somaliland Travel and Subsistence 25,000
• Hargeisa Office (Rent, Furnishing, Communications) 15,000
• Workshops for Data and Network Development 25,000
• Initial Programme Training Support/Materials
(Probably Paramedical 40,000
Phase 2 (36 months) 600,000
• IDS Personnel (8 to 10 months) 75,000
• Development Workers - 4 to 6 (Somali and Expatriate) -
15 person years 225,000
• Workshops - Training - Network 60,000 
Somali Organisation Capacity Building
• International and Somaliland Travel and Subsistence 75,000
• Hargeisa Office 45,000
• Programme Support Services (including training/transport) 60,000
• Programme Support Materials 60,000
(including books, school supplies, health - veterinary basic
drugs and educational materials, water inputs)
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